| indicative zone | AOIs | flood ha | fire ha | total ha |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| former_AANES (indicative) | hasakah, raqqa | 83,338 | 5,348 | 88,686 |
| outside indicative control-area coverage | aleppo, daraa, hama, homs, idlib, quneitra, rural_damascus, suwayda, tartus | 0 | 4,987 | 4,987 |
| spans former_AANES + government (indicative; unapportioned) | deir_ez_zor | 22,166 | 198 | 22,364 |
RQ3 — Damage relative to area of control
In one line (3 of 3 research questions). This page maps where 2026 cropland damage falls relative to indicative areas of control. It is descriptive only and makes no claim that either administration fared better, worse, or caused anything. We deliberately present a table, not a comparison chart.
Damage-vs-control framing DESCRIPTIVE ONLY — NO COMPARISON
Important
Descriptive only — no comparison is made (DEC-005). This is a spatial overlay of 2026 cropland damage against indicative government-controlled and former-AANES areas. Boundaries are contested and treated as indicative only; the Euphrates split of Deir ez-Zor is a schematic proxy line, not an authoritative control map. No differential or causal claim is made or implied. This layer maps where damage falls, and nothing about either administration faring better or worse.
Question. Descriptively, where does the validated 2026 cropland damage fall relative to indicative areas of control?
Why a table, and why no comparison — the responsible-analysis choice
This is the teaching moment of the study, so it is stated up front rather than buried. A side-by-side bar chart of “damage under administration A versus B” would visually invite the differential reading that DEC-005 forbids, even with a caveat attached. So the page presents a table, not a chart, on purpose.
Two structural facts make a comparison impossible even if one were wanted:
- Deir ez-Zor spans both indicative zones, and the per-AOI schema cannot apportion its hectares between them. An RQ analysis may not read the underlying rasters to do so (cross-reference discipline), so its hectares are reported unapportioned.
- The national fire-only governorates have no drawn control geometry at all. Extending contested boundaries to force an overlay there would itself breach DEC-005.
Descriptive tabulation — validated damaged cropland by indicative zone
↓ Zone tabulation (damage_by_indicative_zone.csv)
Hectares are the union-cropland headline; flood figures are the peak single event-date extent (no cross-date double-count, DEC-033). Listing side by side is descriptive co-location, not a comparison.
- Deir ez-Zor is reported as spanning both former-AANES (NE) and government (SW of the schematic Euphrates line), unapportioned, deliberately and not as an omission.
- The national fire-only governorates (Aleppo, Daraa, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra, Rural Damascus, Suwayda, Tartus) fall outside the drawn indicative control geometry; their burned cropland is reported for transparency with no zone attributed.
Caveats (every artifact carries these)
- Indicative and contested boundaries, descriptive overlay only (DEC-005). NOT an authoritative control map. No differential or causal claim may be drawn. The Euphrates is a schematic proxy line; control geography is the indicative 2017–2024 predominant pattern.
- Damaged hectares inherit the pipeline caveats: flood extent is open-water riverine inundation (DEC-023); burned cropland is VIIRS-confirmed and a conservative lower bound (DEC-031).
- First-half-2026 scope (DEC-039): figures are lower bounds; the summer harvest and fire peak is unobserved.